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I. INTRODUCTION 
...the highest form of leadership is to thwart the enemy's plans....Therefore the skillful leader subdues the 
enemy's troops without any fighting. He captures their cities without laying siege to them. He overthrows 
their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes mastery of the 
empire, and without losing a man, his triumph is complete. The weapon, not being blunted by use, remains 
sharp and perfect. 
This is the method of attacking by stratagem, (p. 19 -20) 
What enables the wise sovereign and good general to strike and conquer, achieving things 
beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge 
Sun Tzu (1966 adaptation by Rudnicki) 
The principal factor altering the nature of the threat posed by the modern IADS is the treatment 
of data and information. As a direct descendent of the technology revolution, the introduction of 
information and data-processing networks has transformed the modem IADS. (p. 163) 
JSEAD must evolve beyond the classic "destroy and jam" strategies of resource-rich times when 
US SEAD technology, personnel training, and firepower outstripped virtually any opponent. In adapting 
to the IADS's transition from shooter-based to information-based orientations, JSEAD must focus 
increasingly on information denial as its primary task. The unwitting transition from a shooter-based to 
an information-based IADS provides modern SEAD strategy with the key vulnerability of the modern 
IADS structure: paralyze the enemy by denying the ability to acquire, process, or transmit data. (p. 167) 
Brungess (1997) 
American military officers today most often refer to Clausewitz's unified concept of a general friction 
(Gesamtbegriff einer allgemeinen Friktion) as the "fog and friction" of war. The diverse difficulties and 
impediments to the effective use of military force that those possessing military experience instinctively 
associate with this phrase are generally acknowledged to fmve played significant roles in most, if not all, of 
the wars since Clausewitz's time. Even in a conflict as inundated with technically advanced weaponry as 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), there was no shortage of friction at any level, 
tactical, operational, strategic, or even political. Indeed, close examination of Desert Storm suggests that 
fictional impediments experienced by the winning side were not appreciably different in scope or 
magnitude than they were for the Germans during their lightning conquest of France and the Low 
Countries in May 1940. (p. 1) 
Watts (1996) 
The proceedings of the board convened by the U.S. Navy to investigate the (Iranian airliner) 
incident shozo little sign of any primary role for 'bubble' formation aboard Aegis cruisers (United States 
Department of Defense, 1988). Instead, the role of the multiple technical systems, which heretofore served 
primarily to feed information to tlie tactical operations officer seem to have been reversed. Aboard the 
Vincennes, the Aegis-directed, computer-operated anti-aircraft missile system is the primary system, with 
tlie ship's captain primarily involved in deciding whether to activate its firing mode or not. In this 
situation, the operator lias become an input, not an integrator, and the captain an authorizor rather than a 
commander of action. Fordism lias come to the Navy, one of the last repositories of craft skills and the 
apprenticeship method in the U.S. 
Rochlin (1993) 
The quotations on the preceding page are included as evidence that the 
art of war has always depended on (and will continue to depend on) the ability 
to manage information. Some have speculated that advances in surveillance and 
information technologies will lift the "fog of war" and allow "forces total 
command of future battlefields" (Admiral Owens, cited in Inside the Navy, 23 
January 1995, p. 3. Referenced by Watts, 1996). However, Watts (1996) presents 
a convincing argument that "the prospects for eliminating friction entirely 
appear quite dim because friction gives every evidence of being a built-in or 
structural feature of combat processes" (p.2). Watts (1996) further argues that 
"the roots of surprise" are found "in circumstances that effect honest, dedicated, 
and intelligent men. The possibility of such surprise at any time lies in the 
conditions of human perception and stems from uncertainties so basic that they 
are not likely to be eliminated, though they might be reduced" (p. 46). Watts' 
argument is consistent with observations of the impact of information 
technologies in other fields (e.g., Perrow, 1984). Generalizing from these 
observations, Klein (1997) concludes that any increase in clarity brought about by 
advances in information technologies will be counteracted by pressure to 
"expedite decision cycles." The result will be a "situation where commanders 
are making faster decisions, at the same level of uncertainty that they were used 
to" (p. 15). Rochlin (1993), argues further, that friction is a desirable attribute. 
He argues that friction may be essential to stability in complex organizations 
because it can "give an organization embarking on an incorrect or errant course 
the opportunity to review and possibly to recover before major problems occur" 
(p. 198). Rochlin's analysis emphasizes the fact that friction has both negative 
and positive attributes. The checks and balances that resist the implementation 
of a "good" decision may be essential for protecting the system against "bad" 
decisions. Friction may be an essential attribute for a high reliability 
organization. Thus, this report starts from the assumption that uncertainty and 
the requirement to process information to extract meaning have always been and 
will remain fundamental to the art of war. 
Despite the argument that managing information has always been 
central to the art of war, there is a pervasive feeling (e.g., Whitaker & Kuperman, 
1996) that we are in the midst of a paradigm shift or "revolution in military 
affairs" (RMA) driven by developments in information technology (including 
advances in sensors, displays, communications, and computing devices). 
Brungess's (1994) analysis of developments in Integrated Air. Defense Systems 
(IADS) and the implications for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
mission provides a good example of how information and communication 
technologies are changing modern warfare. This feeling of a paradigm shift has 
generated the construct "information warfare" (IW) and this construct has 
become the banner for focused efforts of the Air Force and other branches of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to get out in front of the new technology and its 
application in warfare. This effort reflects increasing awareness that the masters 
of the new technologies will be the masters of information and that the masters 
of information will be the victors in future conflicts (as they have always been in 
the past). 
The challenge to get out in front of advances in communications and 
information technologies is not unique to the domain of war. This challenge is 
pervasive in modern society. It is also being faced by the transportation 
industry, manufacturing, energy production, chemical process control, 
education, etc. Virtually, every aspect of life is touched in some way by these 
advances. In response to this challenge, a new discipline is emerging—cognitive 
systems engineering (CSE). The target phenomenon for this new discipline is the 
application and design integration of information technology to facilitate work. 
Work is defined quite broadly to include any focused effort to move through a 
problem space (i.e., work domain) to achieve specific objectives. Information 
technology is also defined broadly to include both artificial (e.g., computers) and 
natural (e.g., human experts) information processing systems. 
The development of a new discipline reflects a growing sense that no 
existing paradigm (e.g., information science, control theory, psychology, 
industrial engineering, etc.) spans the phenomenon of work; further, the pieces 
defined by various existing paradigms do not appear to add up to a 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Stated simply, the problem 
of work has emergent properties that can not be completely understood within 
the current disciplinary frameworks. Extrapolations from these disciplines fail to 
predict the impact of new technologies (e.g., the paperless office) and fail to 
provide a foundation for design decisions. 
The development of a new discipline also reflects an increasing 
appreciation of the limits of a reductionist paradigm in science and the 
assumption of linearity upon which that paradigm is based (e.g., Gleik, 1987; 
Waldrop, 1992). The problem of work is increasingly being cast within the 
context of nonlinear dynamics (Flach, 1997). This new appreciation is reflected in 
a changing value system. In reductionist paradigms, control and internal 
validity were paramount. In the emerging paradigm, ecological validity takes 
precedence. Thus, science is moving out of the laboratories to engage problems 
in their natural ecology. Rather than looking to experimental physics as the 
model for investigation, scientists in the new discipline are increasingly looking 
to fields such as ethology and anthropology (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993) for their methods and models. 
This report has two complementary objectives. The first objective is to 
introduce the new field of CSE to those who are wrestling with the problems of 
IW. The second objective is to begin exploring the IW problem as an opportunity 
to test the CSE paradigm. The next section will give a brief introduction to CSE 
Then the IW problem will be framed in the context of the emerging paradigm 
This will help to introduce the IW problem and will provide a more concrete 
view of CSE. The final section will lay out a proposal for how the CSE paradigm 
might be applied to the problem of designing the tools that will lead to victory in 
the new millennium. 
II. COGNITIVE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Many developments in science and engineering have contributed to 
shaping the field of CSE. Even a dedicated attempt to write the history of the 
field would be incomplete. However, even an incomplete perspective on some 
of the historical factors that have shaped the field will help readers to better 
appreciate why CSE has evolved as a discipline. Therefore, I will begin the 
section with a brief (and biased) review of what I consider to be some important 
factors that have shaped CSE. 
One important root of CSE was the work of Taylor and Gilbreth on 
"Scientific Management" (e.g., see Konz, 1987). This work was inspired by the 
technologies that enabled mass production (as well as by the economic 
opportunities offered). The key contribution of these men was the importance 
that they gave to measurement and standardization. First, they helped to 
establish "time" or "rate" (units/time) as a fundamental ruler for judging the 
"best way" or "the "right way." Armed with this ruler, they had a basis for 
controlled comparisons by which the best way to shovel coal or the best way to 
lay bricks could be empirically determined. Further, these controlled 
experiments provided a basis for shifting the responsibility for choosing the 
"work method" from the individual worker or artisan to the manager. It became 
management's responsibility to provide resources needed to determine the best 
way and to provide the training and incentives required to get the workers to 
comply. Also, assembly lines needed to be designed. Because of the number of 
people involved, the time and money were not available to let assembly lines 
evolve to a stable configuration. To a large extent, the stability had to be 
designed into the system (the line needed to be "balanced") if it were to function 
properly. Thus, the time of component operations needed to be predictable. 
This led to increasing standardization of methods and tools. Thus, the industrial 
engineer's or efficiency expert's job was to determine the "best way" through 
empirical tests on component operations; to organize those components into a 
balanced configuration to produce safe, efficient, and stable processes; and to 
implement training and incentive programs so that workers would comply with 
the standards upon which the design was developed. 
In addition to the introduction of empirical methods, an enduring theme 
that can be traced to Taylor and Gilbreth is that increased effort (working harder) 
was not the only path to increased productivity. For examplje, Taylor showed 
that it was possible to increase productivity by mandating rest breaks. People 
began to recognize that it was possible to increase productivity by "working 
smarter." 
Rochlin (1993) presents an interesting discussion of some of the negative 
side effects of the Scientific Management approach. These side effects arise from 
the conflict between efficiency (which often depends on limiting friction) and 
reliability (which often benefits from increased friction in terms of checks and 
safe guards). Negative side effects from the Scientific Management approach 
include de-skilling workers and disenfranchising workers from a sense of 
ownership or responsibility for the quality of the product as a whole. 
Whereas, the prime mover for Taylor and Gilbreth was efficiency, World 
War II (and the technology of war) and, later, the development of nuclear power 
plants, caused increased concern about issues associated with safety. Efforts to 
determine the "right way" shifted from an emphasis on "time" to an increased 
concern about "human error" as a "cause" of potentially catastrophic system 
failures. The Human Engineering Division within the Air Force's Armstrong 
Laboratory was an early center for studying human performance in the aviation 
domain. Fitts and Jones' analyses of pilot error in operating aircraft controls 
(1947a) and of reading and interpreting aircraft instruments (1947b); and 
Christensen's (1947) analysis of navigation were early examples of studies of 
cognition in the wilds of aviation. Fitts and Jones' analyses were based on 
retrospective verbal reports from pilots. Analyses of the errors reported by 
pilots inspired laboratory studies of such things as shape coding of controls 
(Jenkins, 1947) and alternative designs for altimeter displays (Grether, 1949) that 
eventually led to design innovations. Christensen's (1947) field observations of 
navigators earned him membership in the Pole Vaulter's Club as the first civilian 
to fly over the North Pole in an Air Force aircraft. These field observations were 
followed up with experimental evaluations (1949) that led to the design of 
improved plotters that became the Air Force standard. 
Similar work was being done in Great Britain by researchers such as 
Bartlett and Craik who studied the effects of stress and fatigue on skilled 
performance in the "Cambridge cockpit" (designed around a Spitfire cockpit). 
The Cambridge program made many important "contributions in the areas of 
aircrew selection and training, the effects of sleep loss and fatigue, and various 
aspects of visual perception and display design" (Edwards, 1988, p. 7). The 
combination of field observations with empirical laboratory studies set the flavor 
for "human engineering" analyses to come. However, the balance between field 
observations and empirical evaluations achieved in this early work is a standard 
that is rarely achieved today. 
The work of Fitts and Bartlett (and their colleagues) is often recognized 
as a critical step toward the development of the formal disciplines of human 
factors (engineering psychology or ergonomics). Many people currently active 
in the field proudly trace their intellectual roots to either Fitts or Bartlett. Several 
important themes emerged from this era. First, the work in these laboratories 
further demonstrated the promise of an empirical, experimental program for 
investigating the "best way." Second, the emphasis on achieving the "best way" 
shifted from the managers of the work to the designers of the tools (technology). 
It became clear that the probability of human error was influenced by the design 
of tools. Finally, the most important theme was that the errors were often traced 
to failures to process information. There was an increased appreciation for the 
mental or information processing aspects of work (e.g., perception, memory, and 
decision making). 
Research on human error in nuclear power got great impetus as a result 
of the accident at Three Mile Island. Early work (e.g., Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction [THERP]) characterized human error in terms of error 
probabilities and analyzed the work environment in terms of performance 
shaping factors (PSFs) that could potentially increase or decrease the probability 
of human error. These PSFs reflected general design principles (e.g., consistency 
in the layout of instruments) that had their origin in the early "human 
engineering" analyses of Fitts and his colleagues. 
However, because of the high degrees of automation in nuclear power 
production, attention began to shift from the perception-/action-based errors 
(slips) that dominated Fitts and Jones's analyses, to errors of intention (mistakes). 
In the automated world of process control, the operator was less a real time 
controller and more a supervisor-^whose principal function was to detect and 
diagnose faults. In this domain, much of the interesting "activity" was below the 
surface. Thus, it was difficult to make inferences about the factors that 
influenced performance from observing activities alone. Also, it was difficult to 
characterize the problem solving processes in terms of probabilities. Verbal 
protocol analysis became a critical supplement to field observations, and 
qualitative models of the strategies of the human problem solver began to 
replace the more quantitative Chronometrie and probability-based analyses. 
RIS0 National Laboratory was an important center for early research on 
human fault diagnosis (Vicente gives a brief account of the early years at RIS0; 
1997). Rasmussen and Jensen's (1973; see also Rasmussen, 1986; Rasmussen, 
Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994) field study of electronic trouble-shooting was an 
important early study. It relied extensively on verbal protocols. These studies 
were conducted in the electronics shop at RIS0. Audio recordings were made of 
technicians as they diagnosed problems with scientific instruments that were 
brought to them to repair (e.g., multichannel analyzers, oscilloscopes, TV 
receivers, etc.). The technicians were not asked to introspect about their thought 
processes, but were asked to "merely tell what they were trying to accomplish, 
what they were doing and/or observing, and with which instruments" 
(Rasmussen et al, 1994, p. 86). Analysis of the protocols allowed multiple 
strategies for diagnosis to be identified and described. An important aspect of 
this work was that the strategies most commonly adopted by the technicians 
(e.g., topographic search) were not the ones that were predicted by abstract 
analysis of problem solving (e.g., hypothesis and test). Rasmussen (1986) 
considers whether the strategies of the technicians were rational: 
The experiment discussed here clearly indicates that the task is defined by the 
technicians primarily as a search to find where the jault originates in the 
system. They are faced with a system which they suppose has been working 
properly, and. they are searching for the location of the discrepancy between 
normal and defective states. They do not see the task as a more general 
problem-solving task in order to understand the actual functioning of the 
failed system and thus to explain why the system has the observed faulty 
response.... What is rational depends upon the performance criteria adopted 
by the person. Normally a reasonable criterion for a maintenance technician 
is to locate the fault as quickly as possible, and only in special circumstances 
will his criterion be that of minimizing the number of measurements.... From 
this point of view, the procedures found in our records are rational since in 
most cases the faults were found within very reasonable times.... The system 
designer with his theoretical background may quite naturally value as rational 
the "elegant" deductive procedure which is informationally very efficient and 
based upon few observations, but this criterion is not the appropriate one on 
the basis of which performances in real life maintenance work can be judged. 
(p. 55-56) 
Despite the productivity and influence of the work at RIS0, much of the 
work on human factors and human machine systems tended to emulate the 
experimental methods and laboratory paradigms derived from the work of Fitts 
and the Applied Psychology Unit at Cambridge. Through the '70s and the '80s 
there was a heavy emphasis on experimental rigor. Field studies such as the 
work on electronic trouble shooting at RIS0 were exceptions, rather than the 
rule. Most of the work on human performance and cognition utilized abstract 
experimental paradigms (e.g., sine wave tracking, probe reaction time tasks, 
probability judgments, visual search, syllogisms, etc.). These paradigms were 
assumed to reflect general, fundamental aspects of human performance and 
there was relatively little concern about representativeness. Naturalistic field 
studies were rarely reported in the technical literature. Chronometrie analyses 
dominated the literature and verbal protocol analyses were generally regarded 
with deep skepticism. 
Attention and workload became a central theme for laboratory-based 
empirical work in the '70s and '80s. The problem of Three Mile Island and, 
increasingly, problems in aviation and other domains were viewed as problems 
of "too much data." Measuring "mental workload" became a critical challenge 
for researchers. Important design questions focused on: How many people were 
needed to meet the data processing demands of a job (e.g., is a single-operator 
attack helicopter feasible)? How can automation be used to off-load processing 
demands from the human operator (e.g., can the copilot be replaced by an 
automated pilots associate)? How can the data be packaged (integrated in 
graphical displays or distributed over modalities) to minimize the workload? 
In the mid '80s, in part stimulated by a failure to achieve consensus on a 
reliable ruler for measuring workload, and in part inspired by advances in 
graphical displays and successes such as the graphical user interface on personal 
computers, the characterization of the problem began to shift. The problem 
appeared to be less a limitation in data processing and more a problem of 
understanding. During this period, it became increasingly clear that the capacity 
to process information depended critically on the representation of that 
information. Extracting information from a table of numbers might be 
overwhelming, extracting that same information from a graph might be virtually 
effortless. Further, it was not simply the "form" of the representation, but the 
correspondence between the form and the meaning of the process (work) that 
was being represented (e.g., Flach & Bennett, 1996; Rasmussen & Vicente, 1989; 
Woods, 1991). 
In the aviation domain, this shift in emphasis from data processing to 
understanding was evident in the emergence of a new construct—situation 
awareness. Here, the inspiration came from observations of striking differences 
in how individuals responded to the complex information processing demands 
that might be associated with combat. One individual is consistently 
overwhelmed and lost, where another responds instinctively and almost 
effortlessly. Both individuals have the same external representation. However, 
one appears to have a superior internal representation—better situation 
awareness. In other words, one pilot is more expert! 
During this period, Klein and his colleagues (e.g., Klein, Calderwood, & 
Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) began studying decision making in natural environments. 
They began by "observing and taking protocols from urban fireground 
commanders about emergency events that they had recently handled" (Klein, 
1993, p. 139). Klein (1993) discovered that: 
The fireground commanders' accounts of their decision making do not fit into 
a decision-tree framework. The fireground commanders argued that they were 
not "making choices," "considering alternatives," or "assessing 
■probabilities." They saw themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of 
prior experience; they were generating, monitoring, and modifying plans to 
meet the needs of the situations. We found no evidence for extensive option 
generation. Rarely did the fireground commanders contrast even two options. 
We could see no way in which the concept of optimal choice might be applied. 
Moreover, it appeared that a search for an optimal choice could stall the 
fireground commanders long enough to lose control of the operation 
altogether. The fireground commanders were more interested in finding 
actions that were workable, timely, and cost effective, (p. 139) 
As a result of observations of decision making in natural environments, 
Klein developed his "recognition-primed decision model" which emphasized the 
importance of perception and the "zeroing-in" aspects of the decision problem. 
Equally important, however, was the fact that Klein's work helped to stimulate 
wider interest in the problem of "expertise" and "naturalistic decision making" 
(e.g., Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993) and helped to legitimize 
verbal protocol analysis and field observations as essential to a complete 
understanding of human performance in complex work environments. 
In 1995, Hutchins' book "Cognition in the Wild" was published. This 
book summarized a comprehensive field (ethnograghic) study of ship navigation 
that began in the '80s. Hutchins (1995) chose the title "in the wild" to distinguish 
between "the laboratory, where cognition is studied in captivity, and the 
everyday world, where human cognition adapts to its natural surroundings. I 
hope to evoke with this metaphor a sense of an ecology of thinking in which 
human cognition interacts with an environment rich in organizing resources" (p. 
xiv). Hutchins' description of how variations in map design shaped the 
computation problem, making some problems easier and others harder, provides 
a clear demonstration of the fundamental link between the "right way" and the 
"right representation." 
The realization that the functionality of a representation (internal or 
external) relates to its correspondence to problem semantics (to a situation) has 
opened up the problem of work analysis. Whereas, the emphasis of the 
information processing approach was on internal human processing constraints 
(channel capacity, bottlenecks, or resource limitations), there is now increasing 
interest in constraints within the situation. There is growing appreciation that 
the search for the "right way" has to be framed in terms of both an analysis of 
human information processing (awareness) and an analysis of the semantics 
intrinsic to the work domain (situation). In other words, the problem of the 
"right way" involves a distributed information processing system that spans the 
human and the work ecology. This is the focus of CSE—to understand the 
semantics of situations and to discover how awareness can be facilitated through 
the engineering of representations. These representations can be engineered 
through training (internal representations) or through the design of visualization 
tools (external representations). 
The works of Rasmussen, Klein and Hutchins also help to show that it 
was possible for researchers to discover general principles and broad insights 
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into human cognition by delving deeply into the particulars of specific work 
domains. These works illustrate that the image of human cognition that was 
molded from general, laboratory paradigms did not always hold up in the wild. 
The behavior of technicians, fireground commanders, and navigators often did 
not conform to expectations based on logical analyses. Further, the "nonsense" 
laboratory tasks derived from the logical analyses of information processing 
tended to miss the essence of the natural tasks. Semantic and contextual aspects 
that were critical to performance in the natural world tended to be abstracted out 
of the laboratory tasks. 
In sum, the safety tradition was inspired by field observations of natural 
phenomena (e.g., accidents). However, early researchers (Fitts' human 
engineering group and Bartlett's applied psychology unit) were extremely 
innovative in extracting key features of the natural phenomenon that could be 
studied in the laboratory, using rigorous controls and quantitative measures of 
performance. The success of the laboratory paradigms tended to overshadow 
the phenomenon-based insights that inspired them. As a result, the '70s and '80s 
were dominated by a paradigmatic information processing approach to human 
performance where the laboratory paradigms became the phenomena of interest. 
Field studies were rare, and it was generally assumed that natural tasks could be 
understood as a combination of the laboratory tasks (e.g., landing an airplane 
might be considered to be a combination of tracking, visual search, and decision 
making tasks). 
However, pockets of phenomena-centered research were maintained. 
Rasmussen, Klein, and Hutchins are prominent representatives of researchers 
who were not seduced by the power of laboratory paradigms. These researchers 
maintained a phenomenon-centered science. In part, this was motivated by the 
practical need to address problems in natural systems like nuclear power plants. 
But it was far more than this. It was also motivated by a sense that human 
cognition in the wild was fundamentally different than cognition observed in 
captivity; a sense that the context-free, logical puzzles and toy worlds of the 
cognition laboratory were not representative of the demands faced in natural 
work domains; and a sense that performance in the laboratory, where human 
limitations were easily catalogued and the fallibility of human reasoning seemed 
obvious, was not representative of the creative, adaptive nature of people in their 
fields of expertise. Rasmussen, Klein, and Hutchins were not alone. However, 
their work was prominent and helped draw attention to earlier insights of people 
such as deGroot (e.g., Vicente & Wang, 1998), Brunswik (Hammond, 1993; Kirlik, 
1995), and Gibson (Flach, Hancock, Caird, and Vicente, 1995). Gradually, there 
seems to be growing appreciation for the importance of ethnographic 
observations for a basic understanding of cognition. Researchers are beginning 
to consider ways to scale the methods of observation and analysis to the 
complexity of the natural phenomenon, as opposed to cutting the phenomenon 
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into pieces that fit conveniently into laboratory paradigms. This is the challenge 
that has stimulated the new discipline of CSE—to understand the holistic and 
emergent properties of work in a way that will generalize to design—to achieve 
expertise by design. 
This section has presented CSE in an historical context. Table 1 
summarizes this discussion in terms of four "eras" of work on human-machine 
systems. These eras are not necessarily distinct historical epochs, but represent 
themes that, though interleaved in time, are distinctive in terms of the 
technological changes that are addressed. Each era has framed the problem 
differently and each era has focused on a different metric for comparing and 
evaluating potential solutions. 















































In the first era, the motivating technology was the assembly line. The 
key problems were efficiency, standardization of methods, and line balancing. 
The primary performance metric was production rate—how many units per 
minute could be produced. With the advances in technology arising during 
World War II and, later, with the development of nuclear power, focus shifted 
from efficiency to safety or reliability. The defining issue was human error and 
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how to reduce the probability of system failure. The primary performance 
metric was error probability. However, as nuclear process research continued 
and as other systems (like civil aviation) became more complex, the focus began 
to shift to the explosion of data that operators were being asked to deal with. 
Increasingly, system failures were being attributed to limitations of human 
information processing. The defining issue became attention, and numerous 
metrics (subjective, physiological, primary task, and secondary tasks) for 
measuring mental workload were developed. This is still a major concern in 
human factors. As graphical displays became available, it began to be evident 
that, with the appropriate representation, large amounts of data could be 
processed very efficiently. Thus, the focus is now shifting to the problem of 
understanding or situation awareness—how to integrate complex data in a way 
that will facilitate understanding. This is the era of data visualization. In the 
following sections we will suggest two possible metrics for the visualization 
problem—decision-cycle time and robustness (or adaptability). 
The next section will present the CSE framework. A unique feature of the 
CSE framework is the explicit attempt to analyze situations at multiple levels of 
abstraction to reveal the constraints that are intrinsic to a work domain. Section 
IV will begin to flesh out the framework in the context of IW. Hopefully, this 
exercise will provide insights about both CSE and IW. The final section will 
present recommendations for a research program to explore IW using the CSE 
framework. 
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III. THE COGNITIVE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK 
Science and technology have always tried to answer the question "how?" 
How does this or that mechanism work? What are the laws and causal 
properties that underlie this phenomenon and, in the case of technologies, 
how can such knowledge be used to develop a useful tool or machine? 
However, science and technology rarely, if ever, address the question 
"Why?" It seems to be outside their respective universe of discourse. The 
question is ruled inadmissible or inappropriate for the methods and 
capabilities at hand. I reject this absolutely. I submit that questions of 
how and why are so mutually dependent that they should never be 
considered independently, and I attribute much of our present 
circumstance to this unfortunate and unhappy division. Those who know 
how must always ask why. Those who ask why must always think how. 
(Hancock, 1996, p. 461) 
One of the first considerations for an analysis framework is to specify the 
"unit" of analysis. That is, what are the "objects" of analysis? Gilbreth 
introduced the "therblig" as a fundamental unit for motion analysis. Any 
manual operation could be characterized in terms of these fundamental units of 
motion. The information processing approach introduced stages of information 
processing to characterize qualitatively different mental processes. These stages 
represented fundamental cognitive operations, and tasks were described in terms 
of the relative demands on these stages (e.g., perceptual tasks, memory load, 
decision tasks, and manual tasks). Early work on human error characterized 
elemental actions (both mental and manual) in terms of basic human error 
probabilities (BHEPs). An assumption of all these approaches was that there was 
an elemental level of behavior that could be used to characterize all human 
interactions. The assumption was that a description of work in terms of its basic 
behavioral elements would allow inferences about the nature of system 
performance (e.g., workload, error probability, or response speed). Further, it 
has been assumed that studies of the fundamental units, stripped of all 
extraneous context, could provide a human performance database that would 
support extrapolations to the performance of human-machine systems. In fact, it 
has generally been assumed that getting rid of the extraneous context was a 
necessary condition in order to achieve broad generality of inference. 
The CSE approach takes a different tack. This approach begins with the 
assumption that context is not extraneous, but fundamental in shaping human 
performance. Thus, it is important that analyses address the situation level 
constraints. In fact, one could go further and argue that because of the adaptive 
nature of human cognition, the situation constraints will generally dominate for 
experienced or expert operators performing in the domains of their expertise. 
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The context-free laboratory research provides important information about the 
lower thresholds of performance and may generalize well in predicting the 
performance of novices (or experts in unfamiliar contexts). However, it is very 
difficult to extrapolate from these context-free tasks to predict the performance 
limits of experts in their natural work ecology. The literature is full of examples 
(such as the observations from Rasmussen and Klein cited in the last section) 
where generalizations from the laboratory have proven to be very naive when 
tested against the performance of experts in their natural work environments. 
When one shifts the focus from the human information processor to the 
situation, one quickly discovers that there is no single atomistic level of 
description that is privileged (e.g., see Marr, 1980; Rasmussen, 1986; Rasmussen 
et al., 1994). As Marr and Rasmussen have both noted, the multiple levels of 
analysis are loosely coupled. There must be a mapping from one level to 
another, but there are also emergent properties at each level. That is, a 
description at one level of abstraction will provide insights into the phenomenon 
that are not possible at other levels. A complete understanding requires that the 
analyses address multiple levels of abstraction. 
Rasmussen (1986) has characterized the multiple levels of description in 
terms of two dimensions—level of abstraction and level of decomposition. This 
framework is shown in Figure 1. Rasmussen (1986) has distinguished five 
different levels for characterizing complex socio-technical systems with respect 
to the abstraction dimension. Brief descriptions are presented here. However, 
these levels will be fleshed out more fully in the context of IW in later sections of 
this report: 
Functional Purpose. This level identifies the goals and values of the work 
domain. What is the purpose of the system and what are the 
figures of merit for gauging the success of the system? 
Abstract Function. This level specifies the problem domain in terms of 
abstract dimensions that bridge between the values reflected at the 
level of functional purpose and the physical constraints that bound 
the flow of activities and the operation of technologies to support 
those goals. 
General Function. This level decomposes the system into processing units 
with identifiable inputs and outputs. Each processing unit is 
characterized in terms of a transfer function that translates inputs 
to outputs. 
Physical Function. This level identifies the types of technology (e.g., human 
operator, computer, hydraulic or mechanical system, etc.) which is 
associated with each of the functions. 
15 
Physical Form. This level provides a detailed accounting of the space/time 
properties of the system (e.g., where things are located, what's 
connected to what, etc.) and of system performance (e.g., what 
happens, when). 
AGGREGATION - DECOMPOSITION 












Figure 1: A framework for analyzing situations. A full understanding 
of a situation requires descriptions at multiple levels of abstraction 
and at different levels of decomposition. 
Each level of abstraction refers to qualitatively different categories of 
constraints that contribute to the situation. These qualitatively different 
categories are related in a nested hierarchical structure. Categories at higher 
levels within this hierarchy provide the rational context for understanding why 
lower level constraints are significant. Categories at lower levels in the hierarchy 
provide the physical details of how constraints at higher levels can be 
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implemented. The nested hierarchy is typically represented as a triangle (Figure 
2). This graphic reflects the intuition that relatively few categories are needed to 
meaningfully characterize high level constraint of the work domain. However, 
for lower levels many more categories and distinctions are relevant to a 
meaningful characterization. This difference in level of decomposition reflects 
the second dimension of analysis—part-whole decomposition. Together these 
dimensions create the two-dimensional space for characterizing the analysis 
process shown in Figure 1. As a result of inquiry into many different work 
domains and. after analyzing many verbal protocols of domain experts, 
Rasmussen found that experts tend to reason along the diagonal of this space. 
That is, expert reasoning tends to move from global descriptions of functional 
goals to detailed specifications of particular actions on specific components. 
Figure 2: Rasmussen's (1986) abstraction hierarchy represents a 
nested hierarchy in which relatively few categories provide a 
meaningful characterization of the functional purpose of a complex 
system, but many more categories are needed to meaningfully 
characterize distinctions in physical form. 
Figure 3 (from Flach, Eggleston, Kuperman, & Dominguez, 1998) shows 
how different types of classical system analyses fit within the 
abstraction/decomposition space for understanding the problem. Note that 
these different analyses fall along the diagonal of the analysis space and thus are 
consistent with the pattern seen in expert reasoning. The hope is that by 
integrating information represented along this diagonal we can begin to address 
questions of both how and why. 
A unique attribute of the CSE approach is an attempt to integrate across 
the component analyses to achieve a global understanding of the distributed 
control system. Top down relations along the diagonal help to uncover the 
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underlying rationality of the work domain. This rationality provides the reasons 
why things are done or the reasons why things are significant. This is important 
to understanding the focusing-in problem of cognition. That is, what causes 
certain features to pop out in a way that allows experts to focus in on critical 
aspects of a problem early in the analysis. In other words, what is the basis for 
the high situation awareness achieved by experts? How is it that they can 
recognize good solutions as the first to be considered (e.g., see Klein, 1993)? 
Further, how can representations be designed to facilitate these recognitional 
processes and to support high levels of situation awareness? 















Figure 3: An illustration of how different aspects of a cognitive task 
analysis fit within the overall analysis space defined by the abstraction 
and decomposition dimensions. Reasoning down the diagonal helps 
to reveal the rationality that determines why things are done. 
Reasoning up the diagonal helps to reveal the causal relations that 
determine how things are done (from Flach, Eggleston, Kuperman, & 
Dominguez, 1998) 
Bottom up relations along the diagonal help to uncover the causal 
structure within the work domain. This causal structure provides a production- 
like description of how things can be accomplished within the work domain. 
This kind of description is critical for the design of rule-based, counting-out 
processes that are typical of classical artificial intelligence and expert systems. 
These relations can be critical in the design of automated systems: Automating 
the well-behaved (rule-based or routine) aspects of the work can free up human 
resources to be focused on supervising the "messier" aspects of the work. 
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Within the CSE approach the top down and bottom up relations are 
complementary perspectives that contribute to a complete understanding of the 
workspace. A primary goal of the CSE approach is to make the links along this 
diagonal explicit (as opposed to an implicit understanding encapsulated within a 
particular analyst's experience). Unlike classical and modern (e.g., optimal) 
approaches to control systems that begin with restrictive assumptions (e.g., 
linearity, a quadratic cost function, etc.) in order to build quantitatively powerful 
models of the system, CSE focuses on the assumptions, themselves. Classical 
and optimal control models make assumptions that turn messy problems into 
well-defined problems that allow quantitative solutions. But CSE is all about the 
"messiness," because that is why operators are included in most control 
systems—to deal with the messiness (the unanticipated variability). If the 
problems were well-defined and met the limiting assumptions of classical or 
modern control models, then there would be no need for the human. The goal of 
cognitive engineering is to understand the messiness as the most interesting part 
of the problem. As a result, the models of CSE tend to rely more on the 
qualitative insights of control theory, rather than on the quantitative methods. 
This does not mean that quantitative models are not used or that they are not 
valuable tools for developing qualitative insights. But the quantitative models 
are not sufficient. In many respects, CSE is most important for exploring regions 
just outside the limits of a quantitative control analysis of the problem. These are 
the regions where automated solutions are likely to break down. These are the 
regions where human expertise is an essential ingredient for success. In this 
respect, CSE is a means of providing a qualitative glimpse over the horizon set 
by limits of our quantitative control models. It is for this reason that the CSE 
approach is particularly well-suited for addressing the messy problems of "fog 
and friction" that are at the heart of IW. 
From a design perspective, CSE generally focuses on the nature of 
problem representations as a means for dealing with messy problems. Through 
the design of interfaces, CSE attempts to build-external representations that 
allow operators to directly perceive significant features of a problem (e.g., see 
Bennett, Nagy, & Flach, 1997; Flach & Bennett, 1996; Rasmussen & Vicente, 1989- 
Vicente, 1992; Woods, 1991). Through the design of training systems and 
protocols, CSE helps to attune internal representations (in Rasmussen's [1986] 
terms, the dynamic internal model) to significant features of the problem (e g 
Flach, Lintern, & Larish, 1990; Flach, 1997). It is too early in the analysis process 
to speculate about the details of interfaces or training programs for IW. 
However, the final section of this report will speculate on the directions that 
research and analysis might take that will eventually provide a basis for 
advancing our ability to manage the friction and fog of war in the'context of 
current and future advances in information technologies. 
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IV. INFORMATION WARFARE: A COGNITIVE ENGINEERING 
PERSPECTIVE 
This section will be organized around the different levels of abstraction. 
At each level different aspects of the IW problem will be discussed. 
Fundamental questions at each level will concern the availability of descriptions 
at the appropriate level of decomposition. 
Functional Purpose 
The fundamental issue at this level of abstraction is, why does the system 
exist? What is the purpose? The first place to look for answers to these questions 
is within the definition of IW. One definition of IW is "any action to deny, 
exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting 
ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information 
functions" (Widnall & Fogleman, 1995, pp. 3-4; cited in Whitaker & Kuperman, 
1996). This definition explains what IW is in terms of actions (deny, exploit, etc.) 
and the object of those actions (information). However, the definition does not 
address the issue of purpose. What are the functions of information? Why is 
control of information desirable? 
The answers to the questions above cannot be found by focusing on the 
technology (the means of IW). Rather, focus must be shifted to the use of this 
technology. What is the information used for? The purpose is to achieve victory 
in war. Thus, the first step in a CSE analysis is to ask what the information 
technology is used for. So, in this section, the emphasis will be on the ends of 
war. 
The means of war may change, but at the highest level, the goals and 
purposes of war have not changed much sincethe time of Sun Tzu. At a global 
level, the availability of information technologies will not change the ultimate 
purposes of war. Basic aerospace doctrine (Department of the Air Force, 1992) 
outlines nine principles of war: 
Objective: Direct military operations toward a defined and attainable 
objective that contributes to strategic, operational, or tactical aims. 
Offensive: Act rather than react and dictate the time, place, purpose, 
scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be seized, 
retained, and fully exploited. 
Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place. 
Economy of Force: Create usable mass by using minimum combat power 
on secondary objectives. Make the fullest use of all forces available. 
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Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the 
flexible application of combat power. 
Unity of Command: Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one 
responsible commander. 
Security: Protect friendly forces and their operations from enemy actions 
that could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage. 
Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he 
is unprepared. 
Simplicity: Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and 
conducting military operations. (Department of the Air Force, 1992, Fig 1- 
1, p. 1) 
Figure 4 shows one possible network of interactions among these nine 
principles that might reflect some of the trade-offs involved in IW. This 
hierarchical structure does not represent differences in priority. Rather, the 
hierarchy highlights functional interdependencies among the nine principles. 
These interdependencies may be critical for evaluating trade-offs across 
competing goals within IW. 
At the top of this hierarchy is Unity of Command. One of the 
fundamental problems with advances in information technology is the 
distributed nature of information and the requirement to coordinate multiple 
distributed actors. The challenge is to maintain a unified command while 
supporting distributed execution; the key is for the distributed elements to 
function as a coordinated whole, acting toward an appropriate goal. In Owens' 
(1995) terms the challenge is to get "the right information to the right warfighter 
at the right time." Whitaker and Kuperman (1996) compare the problems of IW 
to problems of computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and group 
decision support systems (GDSS) in general. These challenges have created a 
need for a shared information space—"... a medium that could be used 
dynamically ... to help people to share their view of the world with others 
through joint manipulation of each person's personal models of the situation" 
(Bannon, 1989, p. 13). Rochlin, LaPorte, and Roberts' (1987) contrasted the 
formal command structure on an aircraft carrier with the more informal 
command structure that evolved (self-organized) to deal with the distributed 
information and the dynamic demands during landing on an aircraft carrier. 
This command structure appears to adapt to changing information and changing 
loads. Whitaker and Kuperman (1996) suggest the construct, "Common 
Battlespace Picture," to characterize a central representation that is mutually 
accessible, mutually interpretable, mutually meaningful, and mutually 
manipulable. The communication structures on aircraft carriers (as described by 
Rochlin et al., 1987) seem to have evolved naturally so that a Common 
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Battlespace Picture emerges from the interactions among the crew. The 
challenge of IW will be to provide the information links to facilitate the 
development of such a shared representation among joint forces over a much 
broader battle campaign. Rochlin (1993) uses the naval term "having the 
bubble": 
When you have the bubble, all of the charts, the radar displays, the 
information from the console operators, and the inputs from others and from 
the senior staff fall into place as parts of a large coherent picture. Given the 
large amount of information, and the critical nature of the task, keeping the 
bubble is a considerable strain. On many U.S. Navy ships, operations officer 
shifts are held to no more than two hours. 'Losing the bubble' is a serious and 
ever-present threat; it has become incorporated into the general conversation 
of operators as representing a state of incomprehension or misunderstanding, 
even in an ambiance of good information. 
This notional 'bubble' is one of the key elements in obtaining high and 
reliable systemic performance in organizational settings that involve 
considerable risk, large and basically uncontrollable uncertainties, and a high 
degree of organizational as well as technical complexity, operating in real time 
situations where decisions with irrevocable consequences must be made 
quickly, in real time, on the spot (Rochlin, 1989). At the cognitive level, the 
conception of the 'bubble' makes it possible for Navy operations officers, air 
traffic controllers, and (in a somewhat different context) experienced pilots to 
integrate a system of vast operational, technical and cognitive complexity into 
a single, mental representative spatio-temporal map that organizes and orders 
the flow of information and allows decisions to be made on the basis of overall, 
systemic situations and requirements, (p. 215) 
On one hand, information technology, including computer networks and 
the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for sensing and communications, has led 
to an explosion of the amount of information available and has contributed to the 
dispersion of that information. On the other hand, information technology offers 
important opportunities for integrating that information to create a unified 
framework for making command decisions. Thus, depending on how it is used, 
information technology can exacerbate the problems or it can provide unique 
solutions to the Unity of Command challenge. 
It is also important to note that, as Rochlin et al/s (1987) analysis of the 
aircraft carrier suggests, Unity of Command does not necessarily mean 
centralized command. Watts (1996) points to economics as an example of a self- 
organizing system. He quotes Hayek (1988), who writes that "modern 
economics explains how such an extended order can come into being, and how 
it, itself, constitutes an information-gathering process, able to call up, and to put 
to use, widely dispersed information that no central planning agency, let alone 
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any individual, could know as a whole, possess, or control" (p. 14). This is one of 
the major challenges of IW—to design command and control structures that 
maximize the effectiveness of information technologies to achieve coordinated 
and effective action. 
COMMAND & CONTROL 









Figure 4: The principles of war related to three fundamental aspects 
of IW—command & control, counterinformation, and information 
assurance. 
In order to achieve Unity of Command in the face of the complexities of 
advanced distributed information systems, it will be increasingly-important to 
cut through the fog and friction of war to focus on the crux of the problem. That 
is, Simplicity will be at a premium. Klein's (1997) group has found that in 
Marine field headquarters and in nuclear power plant control rooms there were 
many more people than necessary. These excess people added to the complexity 
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of the problem unnecessarily. They were a source of noise and increased 
computational load. It was difficult to identify the key decision makers so that 
they could be provided the "right information" at the "right time." In both cases, 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations were increased by eliminating people 
from the control rooms. The lesson here is that more data does not necessarily 
require more data handlers. Added agents can also add to the information 
burden, without facilitating the decision process. Sometimes, less is more. 
Hand'in hand with Simplicity is the need for clearly defined Objectives. 
More than anything else, it was a failure to maintain clearly defined objectives 
that hindered operations in Vietnam. Clearly defined objectives will be very 
important, so that distributed cooperating agents don't end up working at cross- 
purposes. These objectives (or shared intentions) will help provide a context in 
which it will be easier to interpret and anticipate local adaptations among 
cooperating agents. To a large extent, the meaning of an act can only be judged 
relative to the intentions. If the intentions are vague and ill-defined, then the 
meaning of actions will be ambiguous and coordination will be difficult to 
achieve. Clearly defined objectives help to focus attention and resources on the 
crux of the problem. 
Economy of Force has become an increasingly important concern since the 
end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to justify military expenditures, and the joint forces are 
being challenged to do more with less. Information technologies offer at least 
three obvious paths to increased economy. First, automation can reduce the 
number of humans required to operate some systems. Crew sizes have been 
reduced on aircraft and on ships as a result of advances in automation. Second, 
automation can reduce the exposure of humans to hazardous situations (e.g., 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles [UAVs] and other remotely controlled vehicles). 
This can significantly reduce costs associated with attrition. A third source of 
economy expected from the increased application of information technology is 
the ability to adapt through software, rather than hardware. That is, in the past, 
special missions have required specially engineered systems (e.g., the "Wild 
Weasel" for attacking SAMs [surface-to-air-missiles]). However, with the 
addition of "smart" systems, a single platform may be able to adapt to a wider 
variety of applications. Thus, for example, a few aircraft platforms may be 
adapted to a wide range of missions through software modifications. This 
translates into economies of scale for production and also significantly reduces 
maintenance costs. 
Simple, clearly defined, affordable Objectives provide the basis for a 
unified command and control structure that is capable of proactively dictating 
the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. This Offensive 
posture contributes to (and derives from) our ability to Surprise the enemy, to 
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Maneuver effectively, to Mass our resources to attack critical nodes, and to 
protect the Security of our own resources. Brungess (1997) has contrasted the 
approach to SEAD during Vietnam and the Gulf War. In Vietnam we were in a 
reactive mode. We were constantly one step behind developments of the 
Vietnamese IADS. However, in Desert Storm, superior intelligence, careful 
analysis, and advanced planning allowed us to set the agenda. We understood 
the Iraqi IADS better than they did. As a result, we were able to mass our 
resources to attack critical nodes in the IADS. This enabled the allied forces to 
gain air superiority very early in the conflict. It is important to realize that the 
Iraqi IADS system was technologically far superior to what was faced in 
Vietnam. The Iraqi IADS system was one of the most technologically advanced 
systems in the world. Our success was not a result of vastly superior 
technologies. Rather, the Offensive posture was achieved as a result of a 
superior understanding of how to use the technologies. 
Surprise has always been fundamental to the "art of war." In his work by 
that name, Sun Tzu writes: 
All warfare is based on deception. Hence when able to attack, we must seem 
unable. Wien using our force, we must seem inactive. When we are near, 
we must make the enemy believe we are far away. When far away, we must 
make him believe we are near.. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign 
disorder, and crush him.... Attack him where he is unprepared; appear 
where you are not expected. (1966, p. 12) 
Advances in sensor and information technologies have enormous 
implications for Surprise. One obvious example is the advances in sensor 
technologies that have opened up the electromagnetic spectrum to our (and our 
enemies') vision. Thus, the visual horizon and darkness are no longer sufficient 
cover to hide our movements and intentions from the enemy. Further, the need 
to communicate our intentions to widely distributed forces using the 
electromagnetic spectrum and information/communication networks makes 
these intentions vulnerable to interception by our enemy. A fundamental 
challenge of IW will be to balance the need to communicate simple, well- defined 
objectives to our allies and, at the same time, to shield those intentions from the 
enemy. 
Despite the changes in the information space within which the games of 
deception will be played, Surprise will continue to hinge on fundamental 
conditions of human perception (see Watts, 1996). Ultimately, we are dealing 
with human beliefs and expectations. The nature of the data will change, but the 
crux of the problem will remain the same—to gain advantage by biasing the 
beliefs and expectations of the enemy. Surprise is fundamentally an issue of 
human cognition. 
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The art of war requires an ability to maneuver the enemy into positions 
of disadvantage. Traditionally, this position has referred to a physical place with 
reference to geographical features. For example, Sun Tzu writes that "we are not 
fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the 
country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and 
swamps" (1966, p. 41). In IW, the terrain will not be defined exclusively in 
geographical terms. It is important to consider where the mountains, precipices, 
and swamps are in the information space. What aspects of the information 
terrain facilitate movement and provide advantages? What aspects of the 
information terrain retard movement and waste resources? Klein's (1997) 
analysis of expertise and, in particular, of the barriers to expertise might be a first 
step to characterizing the information terrain. Klein describes six barriers to 
expertise: excessive data, pre-processed data, excessive procedures, performing 
formal analyses, passive data handling (limited ability for information seeking), 
and interfaces that obscure the big picture. In many respects, these barriers are 
natural features of the information technology landscape that can only be 
avoided by careful planning and smart maneuvering. 
A key to victory in any engagement is the ability to Mass or concentrate 
application of power at the decisive place and time. For IW, the decisive place 
and time may have less to do with enemy manpower or firepower and more to 
do with the structure of information networks. Information deniability may be 
decisive. In attacking an IADS, eliminating command and control nodes or 
information links may do far more damage than eliminating radars or SAMs. 
Brungess (1994) makes a strong argument that SEAD of the future must define 
the critical nodes with respect to the distributed information system within the 
IADS. He writes: 
The hallmark of the emerging new age seems to be the growth of information- 
its management and distribution—as a determinant of-power. As a direct 
consequence of the age of computers, information itselfmay be the key to 
power in the twenty-first century. The nation that can control data, deny it to 
others, or willfully shape it will be preeminent in the wars of the future. In 
this context, SEAD criteria may be couched more in terms of information 
denial and shaping than in the more traditional concepts of radar destruction 
and jamming, (p. 91; emphasis added) 
The last principle to consider is Security. Information is a resource that 
needs to be protected and defended. For many people this is^the first issue that 
comes to mind relative to the construct of IW. Thus, a major component of IW is 
information assurance, which the Air Force defines as "measures to enhance and 
protect friendly information and functions" (Department of the Air Force, 1996, 
p. 6). Security was also a primary consideration of Sun Tzu who wrote: 
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The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of 
defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the 
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. Thus 
the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make 
certain of defeating the enemy. (1966, p. 24) 
Consistent with Sun Tzu's intuitions, Security is the foundation for all 
the other functions. That is, if we cannot ensure the integrity of our information 
resources—if we can't trust the data or the analyses (information processes)— 
then everything crumbles. The command and control structure falls apart if you 
cannot trust the command communications or if the simple, well-defined 
Objectives of the commanders are corrupted by noise in the communication 
channels. If you can't trust the intelligence data or the projections of your 
analyses, then you cannot adopt an Offensive posture and you are doomed to be 
one step behind an opponent with reliable information sources. The planning 
horizon will be set by the integrity of the information on which it is based. 
Thus, Figure 4 organizes the nine principles of war in a way that reflects 
three fundamental dimensions of IW. At the top is the command and control 
function. Our ability to define and communicate clear and feasible objectives 
will increasingly depend on our facility with information management tools. At 
the intermediate level are issues associated with counterinformation. This 
involves the real time control of information flow. The key is to stay one step 
ahead of the enemy—to dictate the time and place of engagements; to maneuver 
the enemy into positions of disadvantage; and to focus our power where its 
impact will be most decisive. At the lowest level, the issue is information 
assurance. Can we protect our information sources from the enemy? Ensuring 
the integrity of information sources is critical to all aspects of IW. 
The top down flow in Figure 4 does not reflect importance. The 
principles should be viewed as links in a chain. Every link must bear its 
appropriate load if the chain is to function. However, there is a sense in which 
the top down flow helps to reveal the coupling across the principles. The top of 
the diagram tends to reflect strategic constraints. There is increasing demand to 
approach warfare in an integrated, as opposed to piecemeal, fashion. Brungess 
(1994) makes the argument in the context of SEAD: 
The integrated approach represents the evolutionary trend. Continued 
piecemeal applications, no matter how desirable they may be, must be viewed 
in the reality of the evolutionary trend.... Objectives need to be defined as a 
function of the integrated use of concepts and SEAD weapons, not only 
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because doing this makes sense, but because it represents the most appropriate 
adaptation to changing realities, (p. 82-83) 
War can no longer be planned piecemeal around land, sea, and air (or around 
particular component threats). The services must function as a coordinated and 
complementary whole. This is why Unity of Command is at the top of Figure 4. 
Strategies must be formulated to coordinate across forces. These strategies will 
have to generate clearly defined Objectives that are feasible (relatively Simple 
and realistic/given the economic constraints). 
The bottom up flow in Figure 4 emphasizes the tactical constraints. That 
is, secure information (Security) will be the basis for tactical decisions that will 
allow us to hide our intentions from the enemy (Surprise), to determine the time 
and place for action (Maneuver), and to focus these actions where they will have 
the largest impact (Mass). These are the foundations for proactively (Offensive) 
achieving the strategic goals. 
Viewed from the same perspective but with somewhat different 
semantic labels, we must first gain control of the information realm. Given that 
foundation, we can then proceed to exploit this "high ground" through a wide 
variety of offensive and defensive information operations. These capabilities and 
actions will, in turn, serve to enhance our actions across virtually the entire 
spectrum of the conflict. 
Abstract Function 
The fundamental issue at the Abstract Function level is the issue of 
measurement. In some sense, this level addresses the "currency exchange 
problem" between the ends at the Functional Purpose level and the means defined 
at lower levels within the abstraction hierarchy. The problem is to formulate or 
identify an abstract set of dimensions (measurements) that will allow means to 
be scored or measured with respect to the desirable goals or values of the system. 
Without a common reference, it would be impossible to compare and evaluate 
alternative means. It would be impossible to predict whether a solution was 
feasible or desirable in comparison to other candidate solutions. The goal at this 
level of analysis is to generate a low-dimensional description that will facilitate 
the classification of solutions with respect to their feasibility and with respect to 
their relative costs and benefits. 
Another way to think about the problem of Abstract Function in military 
terms is to consider the link between strategy and doctrine (discussed at the level 
of Functional Purpose) and operational art and tactics. "Strategy and doctrine 
are conceptual; operational art and tactics are pragmatic" (Brungess, 1994; p. 
136). Strategy and doctrine set the goals and norms (prescriptions); tactics 
28 
represents the means. The problem at the Abstract Function level is to identify 
dimensions for measuring tactics that allow these tactics to be compared and 
evaluated relative to strategic objectives. If this can be done, then these measures 
will be useful in the design process. They will provide a basis for predicting the 
"best way." 
How do you evaluate systems relative to the goals for IW? Brungess 
(1994) articulates the measurement problem in the context of SEAD: 
SEAD effectiveness in Vietnam was measured by counting destroyed 
SAM sites and radars. Applying that criteria to the SEAD technologies 
used in Desert Storm yields a confused, possibly irrelevant picture. 
SEAD weapons and tactics evolution has outpaced the development of 
criteria to measure SEAD's total contribution to combat, (p. 51-52) 
Brungess (1994) contrasts four approaches to measurement—historical, 
engineering, commonsense, and object-based. With the historical approach the 
past becomes the measure of the future—that is, successes in the past are 
projected into the future. You use what worked in the past. Also, "lessons 
learned" from past failures might inform design for the future. In stable times, it 
may be safe to generalize from the past to the future; however, in a time of 
revolutionary technological breakthroughs, the past may not be representative of 
the future. The engineering approach focuses on quantitative measures (e.g., 
probability of kills, probability of survival). However, in order to get stable and 
comparable numbers, the engineering approach tends to depend on a narrow 
range of objective tests. These tests typically are chosen to meet the constraints 
of measurement, and are often based on naive assumptions about the operational 
context. The commonsense approach to measurement is a reaction to the failures 
of the engineering approach. Decision makers have grown suspicious of the 
quantitative models used by the engineering approach. The commonsense 
approach emphasizes simplicity and consensus. The opinion and recognition of 
the decision makers become the criteria for measuring the "goodness" of a 
design. The assumption is that decision makers can recognize a good solution 
when they see it. Thus, subjective pilot (or, more generally, operator) opinion 
may be the principal measure of effectiveness. 
The fourth approach to measurement, which Brungess (1994) advocates 
as the preferred approach, is the objective approach. For Brungess the term 
"objective" is synonymous with "goal" or "function." This approach requires a 
shift of focus from the activity of the system (e.g., number of kills) to the 
constraints of the operational space. That is, the measures should be defined 
with respect to functional goals. Thus, for example, the criteria for evaluating 
systems for SEAD must reflect the operational goals. The first questions that 
must be asked are what are the "objectives" of the SEAD mission and what are 
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the constraints to achieving those objectives. One quickly realizes that "'bombs 
on target' no longer carries the certainty of desired system destruction that it 
once did" (p. 169). Today, the objective for the SEAD mission depends more on 
information deniability than on destroying SAMs, and this must be reflected in 
measurement. 
For information warfare, then, the question is, how do you measure 
facility in managing information? The rulers used must reflect both the 
principles of war and the pragmatic constraints on the activities that might serve 
these principles. The measures should help to differentiate an effective 
information processor (e.g., expert) from a less effective information processor 
(e.g., novice). The measures should also provide insights as to what attributes of 
the systems make a difference. To a large extent, systems for IW are "expert" 
systems. Thus, the Abstract Function that must be measured is expertise. 
At an abstract level, the problem of IW is fundamentally a problem of 
expertise. Of the many attributes that differentiate novices and experts, two that 
might be particularly suited to the measurement problems associated with IW 
are the speed at which they perform and the robustness of their performance. 
Experts tend to be much quicker to reach a quality solution. Research in 
numerous fields of expertise show that experts generate high quality alternatives 
very early (often as the first option considered) relative to novices. Also, experts 
tend to be more adaptive (robust);'that is, they are more flexible in the face of 
changing demands. Figure 5 illustrates how measures of speed and flexibility 
might help to identify qualitatively different information processing systems. 
Automatons are fast, but rigid. Automatons achieve speed by taking 
advantage of local consistencies. However, these local consistencies are 
bounded. In other words, automatons utilize heuristics or short cuts that will 
only work in particular contexts. These systems break down if the context 
changes. Note that automatons will function like experts within a narrow scope. 
If context is stable, automatons are good solutions to the information processing 
problem. An autopilot is an example of an automaton. An autopilot can be 
tuned to optimally fly an aircraft, as long as the assumptions about aircraft 
dynamics and the environment that were designed into the control algorithms 
hold. If the dynamics change (for example, due to damage to a flight surface) or 
the environment changes (for example, wind shear) in ways that the designers 
did not anticipate, most autopilots will not be able to reliably compensate to the 
changes. One of the problems with Taylorism was that the focus on efficiency 
tended to drive systems toward performing like "well-oiled machines" and 
workers tended to be seen as cogs within the machine. The result has been an 
efficient system, but a very brittle one that cannot easily adapt to changing 



















Figure 5: A two-dimensional space (decision-cycle speed x 
robustness/adaptability) for characterizing the performance of 
intelligent agents. 
Formal systems are extremely flexible. That is, formal systems can be 
applied across a wide range of situations. However, generality (flexibility) is 
achieved at the price of high computational load. These systems are not capable 
of taking advantage of local constraints that might allow short cuts. Formal 
systems perform like experts when time is unlimited, but these systems break 
down under time pressure. For example, a formal systems approach to a chess 
algorithm would involve an exhaustive search of the space of possible moves. 
Even with great advances in processor speed, the combinatorics of chess set 
pragmatic time boundaries as to how deep a search is possible (thus bounding 
the intelligence of the program). Most advanced chess programs are not purely 
formal systems. The programs incorporate heuristics derived from observations 
of human experts. 
The choice of time and robustness as key dimensions of IW is not simply 
motivated by intuitions about expertise, but also reflects intuitions about the 
fundamental nature of war. Watts (1996) chose two metrics for making historical 
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comparisons relative to the question of whether the "friction" of war is being 
reduced as a result of advances in information processing technologies. These 
dimensions were "decision-cycle times" and "option sets in possibility space." 
These dimensions seem quite consistent with the framework in Figure 5. The 
relation between decision-cycle time and speed is obvious. The concept of 
"option sets in possibility space" may be less obvious, but there is a connection. 
The option sets in possibility space represents the number of feasible or possible 
actions (in other words, the degrees of freedom). The number of possible actions 
can be bounded by the situation. For example, the terrain might constrain the 
feasible directions for attack or escape. The number of possible actions can also 
be bounded by internal constraints. Bounded assumptions incorporated in 
automatons are an example of an internal constraint on action. Thus, the more 
robust an information processing system, the less its degrees of freedom 
(options) are constrained. Thus, Watts' (1996) intuitions about the friction of war 
seem to be consistent with intuitions about expertise. A system will be more 
expert in dealing with the friction of war to the extent that the system can 
implement decisions quickly without artificially constraining the possibilities. 
If we return to the expertise literature there is an apparent contradiction. 
Observations of experts (e.g., chess players) show that experts consider many 
fewer options before choosing an alternative than do novices. One grand master 
is reported to have responded to the question of how many options he 
considered before making a move as-follows: "Just one, but it's the best one!" 
This is only an apparent contradiction. This example illustrates the difference 
between tacit and explicit knowledge. Experts do not explicitly compare and 
contrast as many alternatives as novices. However, this does not mean that the 
experts have fewer alternatives. The fact that experts consistently generate the 
"best" alternative suggests that many options are being considered. It seems that 
experts are able to zero-in on the correct alternative using tacit perceptual or 
recognitional processes (e.g., Klein, 1993). The case might be made that it is the 
efficiency of the tacit perceptual or recognitional processes that allows the expert 
to be both fast and robust in processing information. 
So, speed (or decision-cycle time) and robustness (or the number of 
options in possibility space) may be two fundamental dimensions that ought to 
be reflected in performance measures. However, these measures may be too 
gross for many design and evaluation questions. It might be useful to consider 
what attributes of information processing systems create the possibility for speed 
and robustness. Here is where Klein's (1997) analysis of barriers to expertise 
might help to link the characteristics of expertise to the characteristics of 
information technologies. In many cases, these technologies are designed to 
function either as formal systems or automatons. However, developments in 
graphical displays and visualization technologies (e.g., virtual reality [VR]) may 
provide an opportunity to enhance perceptual and recognitional processes that 
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appear to be fundamental to expertise. In Whitaker and Kuperman's (1996) 
terms, expertise may depend on the availability of a Common Battlespace Picture 
that shows the "full space of possibilities" and supports recognitional processes 
so that the best option within this space can be "seen." 
Decision-cycle time and robustness represent the negative and positive 
aspects of friction. Reducing friction will generally result in faster decision-cycle 
times, but less robustness. Increasing friction will result in slower, but often 
more reliable (robust) decisions. The expert is capable of faster decisions, but this 
does not mean that the expert is always moving forward at the fastest pace. Part 
of the skill is to "go quick, slowly." For example, novices in sports often rush 
their actions (and novice readers and speech makers often speak too fast). The 
key is not how fast you go, the key is to be able to respond at the right time. 
Sometimes, it is the expert's ability to slow down—to be mindful or heedful of 
potential dangers or to recognize when to wait for information that is missing— 
that contributes to increased reliability. The experts can go fast, but they don't 
have to go fast. They also recognize when it is appropriate to put on the brakes 
and to wait for more information (let the defense commit before you take your 
shot). This attribute of expertise is often referred to as "metacognition" (see 
Dominguez, 1997 for an interesting discussion of the role of metacognition in 
surgical decision making). This heedful attitude in which decisions are 
continually monitored, reviewed, and critiqued is a common attribute of high- 
reliability systems. As Rochlin (1993) notes "bubbles cannot be acquired quickly 
or simply, and they require elaborate and overlapping networks of 
communications for their establishment and maintenance" (p. 215). Rochlin 
reports that tactical operations shifts on ships will sometimes overlap by up to an 
hour to ensure that the "bubble is transferred smoothly to the succeeding tactical 
officer without a potentially dangerous break in routine or perception" (p. 215). 
At a trivial level, all work domains are about expertise. For example, 
nuclear power plant operation depends on the expertise of the operators and 
medicine depends on the expertise of doctors and nurses. However, these work 
domains are not fundamentally about managing information—they're about 
managing power flow (mass and energy) and about managing health (anatomy 
and physiology). IW, on the other hand, is fundamentally about managing 
information. It is about having a clearer, more accurate view of the world than 
your enemy. It is about shaping your enemy's perceptions and expectations. In 
Sun Tzu's terms, it is about "defeating your enemy's plans" (1966). If the 
information war is won, then the need for fighting, destruction, and bloodshed 
will be minimized. 
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General Function 
The next level of abstraction considers IW.in terms of the flow of 
information and action. At this level of analysis, systems are generally described 
in terms of networks of connected processing stages, where each processing 
stage can be described either in quantitative terms (a transfer function) or 
qualitative terms (process limitations and general properties of inputs and 
outputs). As-Whitaker and Kuperman (1996) have noted, probably the most 
cited theoretical construct in the IW literature is the OODA Loop of Boyd (1987). 
The OODA Loop is a closed-loop organization with the stages Observe, Orient, 
Decide, and Act, as shown in Figure 6. The OODA Loop emphasizes the 
dynamic, iterative nature of information processing. The iterative or circular 
coupling between perception and action have long been overlooked in basic 
studies of cognition. However, several recent models show an increased 
appreciation for the iterative nature of cognitive processes. These include 
Neisser's (1976) perception-action cycle, which is often cited in the literature on 
situation awareness; Klein's (1993) recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of 
naturalistic decision making (shown in Figure 7); and Rasmussen's (1986) 
decision ladder (see also Flach & Rasmussen, in press). 
The cyclic nature of the IW problem has also been reflected in analyses of 
military missions. Figure 8 (adapted from Brungess, 1994, Figure 17) contrasts 
the vertical model of information flow that reflects a traditional view of war with 
the cybernetic model that he feels is a much more accurate characterization of 
modern warfare. 
The cyclic nature of cognition is a critical aspect of the dynamics of 
information processing and has often been de-emphasized in the basic cognitive 
research literature that has tended to treat information processing as a linear 
(horizontal) sequence of independent stages. It has also been de-emphasized in 
classical models of warfare that treat the flow of information as a linear (vertical) 
flow of commands and actions. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
any model of IW systems at the functional level will have to address the iterative 
nature of the process. While the OODA Loop recognizes the circular coupling, it 
is far too gross (too holistic) to be useful for characterizing the flow of 
information and action in a way that can inform design decisions. 
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Observe 
Act OODA Loop Orient 
Decide 
Figure 6: The OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. 
RPD Model 
Klein, 1989 Recognition Primed Decisions 
Figure 7: Klein's RPD model of naturalistic decision making 
illustrates the closed-loop coupling of perception and action: 
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Figure 8: The military command structure as a rigid, vertical 
hierarchy or as a dynamic system of interacting elements (Adapted 
from Brungess, 1994). 
A more detailed look at the information flow shows many coupled OODA 
Loops operating at different time constants and reflecting different levels of 
analysis (e.g., Whitaker & Kuperman's 1996 analysis of Scud hunting). In his 
classic text on Electromagnetic Conflict, Fitts (1980) distinguishes three different 
analysis loops: ELINT (electronics intelligence), ESM (electronic support 
measures), and ECM (electronic countermeasures; Figure 9). [Note that the terms 
ELINT, ESM, and ECM have evolved since Fitts' (1980) characterization of the 
systems. The nested loops are presented here to give a sense of what the nesting 
of OODA loops might look like. This is not intended to be a definitive model of 
electromagnetic warfare.] The ELINT loop represents information that is 
collected over long time periods (weeks to years) and that is subject to extensive 
analysis and evaluation. This loop is involved in long range strategic planning. 
It involves a long-term analysis of allied and enemy capabilities and tendencies 
that helps to determine long range objectives and general strategies. 
36 
Figure 9: Electromagnetic warfare can be viewed as a nested set of 
control loops. The outer loops have a longer time constants. 
The ESM loop operates with a smaller time constant (hours to weeks). 
The ESM loop reflects the information that a tactical commander would gather in 
order to prepare for tomorrow's mission. It might include input from regularly- 
scheduled reconnaissance missions or from debriefs of the previous mission. The 
ESM loop represents tactical planning. It involves integration of highly 
processed data available from ELINT with raw data (with perhaps some low 
level analyses) obtained from recent observations of the situation. Some of the 
data from the current observations are also passed up to be integrated with other 
information as part of the ELINT loop. 
Finally, there is the ECM loop. This loop has a much smaller time 
constant (milliseconds to hours). This loop involves the moment-to-moment 
actions of a pilot, a field commander, or an individual soldier in response to 
direct observations of the enemy. Performance within this loop reflects the plans 
and preparations generated in the ESM loop and the data directly available to 
the warfighter. 
It is the couplings and time constants of these interacting loops that begins 
to provide a context for answering questions about the "right information" and 
the "right time." The general CODA Loop is far too gross a formulation for 
addressing these questions. A critical question is how can these loops (each 
operating at a different time constant and on different kinds of data) interact to 
build a unified Common Battlespace Picture that will support full* consideration 
of options and timely decision making at all levels? 
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Figure 10 (adapted from Homer, 1996) shows some of the nested loops 
involved in IW. Note the "push" and "pull" of information in this diagram. This 
emphasizes that the Common Battlespace Picture is a joint function of the 
available data and of the questions that analysts choose to ask. This is a critical 
aspect of the dynamic. All the data may be available to construct an accurate 
visualization of the battlespace; however, an accurate visualization may not be 
realized because the right questions were not asked. In CSE, the terms "data" 
and "information" are sometimes contrasted to make this point. Data are 
whatever is available from the sensors, but "information" is the answer to 
questions the analysts are asking. Thus, information can be missing, due either 
to a lack of data or to a failure to ask the right question. 
An implicit assumption of the loops in Figures 6-10 is that there is a 
problem to be solved. The emphasis is on problem solving! However, for IW, 
particularly in the post cold war world era where the threats are ill-defined, the 
main problem may not be problem solving, but problem finding. Figure 11, 
adapted from Klein Associates (1997), explicitly includes problem detection 
within the representation of the perception-action loop. Problem finding is 
implicitly recognized in Figure 10 as an important aspect of "information pull." 
As the following quote from Klein Associates (1997) illustrates, for systems to 
function skillfully the analysts must be actively engaging the data (information 
pull): 
[an] important factor is whether the problem solver forms his/her own 
understanding or just accepts the description provided by someone else (or by 
a decision support system). Having an active engagement in building up 
one's own interpretation is important for detecting early signs of a problem. 
Failures to detect problems result from lack of experience, but they also occur 
when people explain away early signs of the problem, and when they show an 
"automation bias" by passively accepting the outputs of a computer-based 
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Figure 10: A hypothetical view of the general functional flow for IW 
(adapted from Homer, 1996). 
Figure 11: Explicit representation of problem finding as part of the 
closed-loop perception-action coupling (from Klein Associates, 1997). 
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Physical Function 
At this level of analysis, consideration is given to allocation of the 
various functions. A fundamental issue at this level concerns what tasks or 
functions to allocate to humans and what tasks to allocate to computers and 
automatic control systems. Table 2 (from Sheridan, 1996) shows some of the 
logical ways that machines and humans might be coupled. Certainly, IW is well 
beyond Level 1 of Sheridan's scale. The question is, how much beyond this level 
can we venture? How much can we rely on information technologies and how 
much authority can we give to our computational engines? Appropriate 
decisions about automation can enhance expertise, but inappropriate allocations 
may result in barriers to expertise. This will not be a simple question that can be 
answered once and for all. Pronouncements such as "a human will always have 
the final authority" are naive. The question of the degree of automation must be 
addressed over and over again within each of the many nested OODA loops that 
make up the dynamic system of IW and must be reassessed in the context of 
continuing advances in technology. 
Table 2: Scales of degrees of automation 
Scale of Degrees of Automation (from Sheridan 1996) 
1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must do it all. 
The computer offers a complete set of action alternatives, and 
3. Narrows the selection down to a few, or 
4. Suggests one, and 
5. Executes the suggestion if the human approves, or 
6. Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 
7. Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, or 
8. Informs him or her after execution only if he or she asks, or 
9. Informs him or her after execution if it, the computer, decides to.  
10. The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the 
human. 
Table 3 (from Flach, Eggleston, Kuperman, & Dominguez, 1998) outlines 
some important considerations with respect to the function allocation problem. 
The question is, which combinations of systems will result in the most efficient 
coordination across the various control loops? What combination of physical 
components will result in the greatest expertise, permit the shortest decision- 
cycle times and the greatest flexibility or adaptability? What allocations will 
minimize the barriers to expertise? 
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Key Considerations for Function Allocation 
Priority. Relative importance or criticality of a particular function. Is it 
essential or discretionary with respect to the overall mission objectives? 
Precedence Constraints. Sequential dependencies across the functions. 
To what extent do functions depend on the successful prior completion 
of other functions? 
Temporal Constraints. Are there fixed windows of opportunities or 
fixed time schedules associated with particular functions? 
Spatial Constraints. Does performance of the function depend on 
being at a particular place or location? 
Structural Understanding. Does the agent have the appropriate 
knowledge or know how (e.g., right training for operators or right 
programming for automation) to accomplish the functions? 
Information Availability. Does the agent have adequate information 
(good situation awareness) for completing the function? 
Resource Availability. Does the agent have adequate information 
processing capacity (e.g., attention, memory, computational power) or 
physical capacity (e.g., free hand) to accomplish the function? 
Effector Capability. Is the agent capable of performing the actions 
necessary to complete the function? Can the agent respond in time with 
the appropriate precision? 
Shared Mental Models. Do the cooperating agents have a common or 
compatible vision (e.g., common assumptions, shared rationality) of the 
problem domain? 
Information Coupling. Is there sufficient information for each agent to 
know what and how other agents are doing? 
Effector and Resource Complementarity. Do the effector and resource 
capabilities of the team span the demands of the work domain? 
Authority Structure. How are dynamic decisions about allocation 
handled (e.g., central authority, first-come, consensus, volunteer, etc.)? 
How are conflicts resolved? 
A reasonable hypothesis, in the context of our understanding of 
expertise, is that efforts should focus on bringing the data closer to critical 
decision points. Two very different solutions are currently being explored. One 
solution is to bring the data forward, so that it is more readily available to the 
warfighter. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System ([STARS) are two examples where 
information is moved forward so that warfighters have more direct access to 
ELINT and ESM. Another solution is to move the decision points back to the 
information sources. Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UGAVs) are an 
example of this approach. That is, the warfighter's role (pilot) is automated and 
the decisions are moved back to a command center where ELINT and ESM data 
are more easily accessed and displayed. 
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Which will be the best solution—moving the data forward or moving the 
control back? A major issue to consider, relative to moving the data forward, is 
the issue of cognitive workload. There is a danger that the warfighter will be 
overwhelmed with data. A key consideration will be the form or the 
representation. If representations can be designed that support recognitional 
processes, then more data will not necessarily mean more workload. A major 
concern, relative to moving control back, is that the automation of the ECM role 
will reduce the flexibility in that loop. Key considerations will be the time 
constraints on communications from the control center to the UCAV and the 
sophistication of the automatic control algorithms that can be implemented in the 
UCAV. Ultimately, this will not be a simple dichotomous choice—it will be a 
question of when /where /how can data be moved forward and how far forward; 
and when/where/how can control be moved back and how far back. Again, the 
issue is to get the right data to the right people at the right time! 
Physical Form 
At this level of analysis the specific physical form of the system and the 
specific trajectories of activities are considered. At the previous levels, questions 
were framed in terms of different aspects of the functional relations; in this 
section the pragmatics of actually building the physical system and of physically 
performing the activities are considered. 
At a gross level it is clear that IW will not be bounded by the same space- 
time constraints that bounded conflict in the days of Sun Tzu or even as recently 
as World War II. Vietnam was fundamentally different than WWII and Desert 
Storm was different than Vietnam. The classical partitioning of forces according 
to geographical distinctions of land, sea, and air will no longer be feasible. IW 
will require an integrated joint forces approach to war. IW is going to involve 
managing widely (perhaps globally) distributed forces and is going to require a 
degree of coordination and synchronization among those forces that has never 
been demanded in the past. We can also say with confidence that the human will 
remain a critical element in IW. Computers will be essential. The full 
electromagnetic spectrum will be utilized. Further, satellites and global 
positioning systems (GPS) will be involved. Also, it is clear that the flow of 
information will not be bounded by military systems. International news 
services and global communication systems will also be coupled more intimately 
to the war than ever before. Thus, the link between politics, public opinion, and 
military action will shape the dynamic of IW. Already, we see evidence in Desert 
Storm that managing mass media will be part of the IW problem. 
Already, it should be apparent why this is the base of the abstraction 
hierarchy. The number of issues to consider at this level of analysis is staggering. 
These issues span many different disciplines. How is it possible to deal with all 
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the potentially relevant data at this level? This is why the abstraction hierarchy 
is essential. The analyses at the higher levels of abstraction can be used to help 
parse the problem at lower levels. Thus, the categories defined at higher levels 
of abstraction can be used to organize and integrate data at the physical level. 
Having the categories does not reduce the complexity of the problem, but these 
categories can facilitate the management of the complexity. The categories can 
help to guide and bound generalizations. The categories formulated at higher 
levels of abstraction provide a representational framework that may facilitate 
expertise in making decisions about the physical form of IW systems. There are 
no guarantees, no simple, easy to understand recipes that will tell us what 
physical form IW systems should take. The hope, however, is that by working 
up and down the abstraction hierarchy we may be in a better position to ask the 
right questions and that these questions will facilitate the iterative process of 
generating and testing hypotheses about the physical form of the system. 
Summary 
Figure 12 uses the CSE Abstraction/Decomposition space to summarize 
the discussion in this section. As noted earlier, the diagonal within this space 
seems to provide the level of description that is most relevant to the design of 
systems that function as experts. At the top level, a general understanding of the 
goals provides the context for more detailed analyses at lower levels. At the 
bottom level, every element within the physical system must be considered in 
detail with regard to its interface to other pieces of the system. On one hand, a 
design based on a good understanding of general principles might fail because a 
small physical detail is overlooked (for example, an electronic suite is developed 
with an interface that is not compatible with other electronic systems in the 
cockpit). On the other hand, all the pieces can fit together well and function 
exactly as the designer intended, but if they were not designed in the context of 
the general functional requirements of the warfighter, the system may never be 
used. The designer solved the wrong problem. 
Figure 12 is a map of where we are and the directions we need to go with 
respect to a CSE analysis of IW. At the Functional Purpose level there is an 
abundance of information about the goals and basic doctrine of warfare. For the 
most part, detailed analyses are not required here. It is simply a matter of 
communicating the information in a way that designers will appreciate. 
The Abstract Function level provides a critical challenge for the analysis 
of IW. How do we express the functional requirements in terms that reflect 
measurable attributes of design solutions? Dimensions like decision-cycle time 
and robustness provide a first-cut, general hypothesis about dimensions that 
might be useful. While these dimensions might be useful for post hoc 
comparisons of systemic design solutions, these measures are probably too 
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general to provide much guidance to designers of information technologies. 
Klein's (1997) discussion of the barriers to expertise associated with information 
technologies might provide useful hints that might provide the basis for a 
higher-dimensional description of the design space. On the other hand, classical 
engineering measures of probability of kill or probability of survival are 
probably too elemental—in that their measurement will typically require 
restrictive assumptions about the operational context. 
The General Function level also is a challenge. It is clear that IW will 
involve a closed-loop perception-action dynamic as typified by the OODA Loop. 
However, it will be a complex network of interconnected loops operating with 
different time constants and operating at different levels of data decomposition 
and integration. In order to fully characterize this network it will be necessary to 
develop detailed models of prototypical IW systems (e.g., Whitaker and 
Kuperman's (1996) analysis of Scud hunting) and then, through comparisons and 
contrasts among these systems, it may be possible to abstract a picture of the 
general functions that govern the flow of information and action for IW. The 
functional flow representation must make both the "push" and "pull" (e.g., 
problem finding) aspects of IW explicit. 
The Physical Function and Physical Form levels represent the pragmatics 
of the design problem. At this point, analyses should begin with evaluations of 
general solutions (across different domains, as typified by Sheridan's list) and 
particular solutions that exist for IW (e.g., JSTARS and UAVs). What works? 
Where are there difficulties? These kinds of observations will be useful for 
understanding how the different functional components (humans and machines) 
can most effectively be coupled and will draw attention to key elements of 
physical form that may be critical to performance. 
It is important to appreciate the fact that the diagonal of the CSE space is 
a target that can only be approached asymptotically. That is, there will always be 
unanswered questions. Our understanding will never be complete. Partly, this 
is due to the fact that technologies are not stationary—they are continuously 
evolving. But, more fundamentally, it is due to the nature of the design and 
discovery process. The CSE analysis cannot be isolated as a precursor to design. 
The CSE analysis must be integrated within the iterative process of design. The 
CSE analysis is a mechanism for generating hypotheses. Each design is a test of 
our hypotheses. The results from each test must be fed back into the analysis 
process so that we can generate better hypotheses. In an important sense, CSE is 
not an external framework for evaluating IW. Rather, CSE is intrinsic to IW. 
CSE is the basis for a proactive (as opposed to reactive) approach to IW. CSE is 





















































Figure 12: Fleshing out the CSE framework with some observations 
about IW. 
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V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS. 
In the previous section we attempted to present an overview showing 
where we are and the directions in which we ought to be moving in order to 
design for IW in the future. In this final section, we will present some 
suggestions for how to proceed. 
Hypothesis Testing vs. Hypothesis Generation 
Our society places great faith in the scientific method—and for many the 
scientific method is synonymous with empirical experiments. Therefore, there is 
a common expectation that the first step to understanding IW will be to do some 
experiments. The first impulse is to generate data! So, if there are questions 
about a particular technology, then let's do an experiment in which we compare 
performance of the new technology with a control condition using the old 
technology. We test two groups in an identical battle scenario. If the group who 
has the new technology has a greater percentage of hits and /or has fewer losses, 
then we can infer that the new technology is beneficial. Obviously, this is a clear, 
straightforward, wrong approach to the problem. 
The first problem with this approach is the attribution problem. Was the 
difference (or lack of difference) in performance due to differences in the 
technology? Anyone familiar with experimental design realizes that there are 
many potential confounds (e.g., individual differences) that must be dealt with. 
There are ways to reduce the confounding, but even in the simplest experiments 
the potential for confounding cannot be totally eliminated. However, for 
complex systems and new technologies the attribution problem is further 
complicated by the fact that there is never a simple dichotomy (e.g., old 
technology vs. new technology). For example, you can't do a single experiment 
to compare graphical displays to numeric displays of information. There are an 
infinite number of ways that a graphical display might be implemented in a 
design. So, it would be a mistake to throw out graphical display technology, 
because one particular implementation of a graphical display did not work. The 
idea of a "critical experiment" is probably a fiction that we have created in our 
narrative retelling of the story of science. It is definitely a fiction with regard to 
the problem of evaluating complex technologies for application in complex work 
domains. To quote Alan Newell (1973)—"You can't play 20 questions with 
nature and win!" 
A second problem with the hypothesis testing approach is the 
generalization problem. Is the scenario that you choose for your test 
representative of the actual operational environment or of the future 
environments where the system will eventually be implemented? Are the 
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subjects in your experiment representative of the ultimate user population? If 
the experimental context is not representative of the operational context, then the 
differences observed in the experiment may be totally irrelevant to the design 
questions that originally motivated them. You may have exactly the right 
representation for the "toy" world employed in the laboratory, but it may be 
exactly the wrong representation for the operational problem. 
A third problem with the hypothesis testing approach is the 
measurement problem. Are the performance measures that you collect in the 
experiment sensitive to the differences that make a difference in the operational 
environment? As Brungess (1996) notes "SEAD effectiveness in Vietnam was 
measured generally by counting destroyed SAM sites and radars. Applying that 
criteria to the SEAD technologies used in Desert Storm yields a confused, 
possibly irrelevant picture" (pp. 51-52). 
The point to be made here is that a hypothesis testing program of 
research may generate lots of data, but it does not allow you to avoid the 
problems posed by the Abstraction Hierarchy. Without the kind of conceptual 
framework provided by the Abstraction Hierarchy, the data from a "twenty 
questions approach" will not yield information relevant to the design questions. 
Hypothesis testing is a reactive mode of science. It will generally lag well behind 
the design questions and will never keep up with the evolution of new 
technologies. For example, the graphical desktop interface on personal 
computers was not discovered by Human Computer Interface (HCI) researchers. 
It was a product of the design process. Laboratory-based research in HCI is still 
struggling to explain why this interface works as well as it does. 
The problems of design require a proactive approach to science. The 
emphasis needs to be on exploration of the phenomenon, discovery, and 
hypothesis generation. The first step in this program of research is for 
researchers to immerse themselves in specific phenomena. The model for this 
kind of science is anthropology or ethology (not experimental physics). The 
challenge is to enter a work environment and to discover the intrinsic semantics 
of that environment. The challenge in doing this is to release our natural biases 
and expectations about what is logical so that we can discover the natural 
intrinsic logic (eco-logic) of the work domain. Again, remember the examples 
from Rasmussen and Klein—expectations based on normative logics are 
generally not validated when tested against performance of experts in their 
natural domain. 
First Step 
The first step in this program should be to identify some specific 
examples where new technologies are being implemented in ways that might be 
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representative of the general problems of IW (e.g., Scud hunting, AW ACS, 
UCAVs). These specific applications then need to be placed under a microscope. 
That is, the specific examples need to be studied intensively using table-top 
analysis methods, naturalistic observation, and knowledge elicitation techniques 
(see Flach, Eggleston, Kuperman, & Dominguez, 1998 for descriptions of these 
methods in the context of UCAVs; see also Carnegie Group, 1997 for a review of 
knowledge elicitation tools; or Klein, 1997 for a discussion of naturalistic 
observations of teams). 
The data acquired from these explorations must then be integrated using 
the CSE framework. The goal is to build a CSE description of each specific 
example. In other words, the preliminary goal is to fill in as much of the 
diagonal of the Abstraction/Decomposition space as possible. This will be an 
iterative process of observing, analyzing, and refining observations. Analyses 
must proceed simultaneously at all five levels of abstraction. Further, it must 
proceed in such a way that discoveries at each level inform (and are tested 
against) discoveries at other levels. The initial tests of these observations will be 
the ability to predict events in the natural environment and the internal 
consistency across levels of abstraction. 
As an internally consistent description emerges, then we may be in a 
position to formulate reasonable experimental tests of some of our hypotheses. 
The most important tests of our hypotheses, however, will not necessarily be 
laboratory experiments, but rather they will be designs (Kirlik, 1995). The 
ultimate test of the CSE analysis is whether the data can be integrated, not as an 
abstract data base, but as concrete solutions. The CSE paradigm must ultimately 
be tested against the problem of design. To be more precise, the value of CSE 
will be measured against our ability to engineer effective problem 
representations. These representations will be implemented either as interfaces 
(external representations) or as training protocols (internal representations). 
The term interface is used here in its broadest sense. This includes all of 
the technologies that stand between the human operators and the problem space 
with which they are interacting. For example, it includes displays and controls 
(in all modalities) and any computational engines (e.g., decision aids, filters, 
simulations, etc.) that might be used in the analysis and decision making process. 
The term "training" includes classical forms of instruction. However, 
there is clear evidence that traditional classroom or textbook approaches to 
instruction are not sufficient to developing expertise. The development of the 
recognitional or perceptual skills of expertise requires practice, practice, practice! 
Thus, an important part of the CSE design effort will focus on incorporating the 
developing understanding of the problem into high fidelity simulations where 
operators can "exercise" their skills in conditions that are as close to "real game" 
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conditions as possible. A bonus of this process is that the high-fidelity training 
simulations also offer a test-bed for empirically evaluating interfaces (and, 
conversely, high-fidelity concept demonstration facilities, if developed early in 
an evolutionary design process, may be migrated into the training support 
system world of application). These high-fidelity simulations offer a middle 
ground between the "toy worlds" of the bench scientists and the operational 
world of the field researcher. Thus, they offer the possibility for research 
programs that can have both high internal validity (control over potential 
confounds, precise manipulation of independent variables, and precise 




War is a complex and chaotic human endeavor.' Human frailty and 
irrationality shape war's nature. Uncertainty and unpredictability—what 
many call the "fog" of war—combine with danger, physical stress, and human 
frailty to produce "friction," a phenomenon that makes apparently simple 
operations unexpectedly, and sometimes insurmountably, difficult. 
Uncertainty, unpredictability, and unreliability are always present, but sound 
doctrine, leadership, organization, core personal values, technologies, and 
training can lessen their effects. {Air Force 1-1,1997) 
Will advances in information technologies provide new tools for 
managing the fog and friction of war, or will they further complicate the 
problem—exaggerating uncertainty and reducing reliability? Certainly, support 
for both sides of this question is available. There are many examples where 
advances in computational power and in graphical displays have facilitated 
problem solving and led to increased efficiency and reliability. On the other 
hand, one does not have to look far to find examples of "clumsy automation," 
where technology is a barrier to expertise. 
The path to "clumsy automation" is a seductive one, and there is some 
evidence that we may already be heading down that path (e.g., Owens, 1995). It 
is important that we heed this warning from Rochlin (1993): 
the attitudes of many of those responsible for the design and implementation 
of the new systems have decidedly Taylorist resonances—right down to the 
scientific belief that there is indeed 'one best way' to perform any task, 
including a managerial one. Even more striking is the return to the search for 
central control (Beninger, 1986). In her interviewing, Zuboff'(1984) noted 
several instances where the manager's view of the intended result was a 
centralization of control in order to reduce uncertainty and allow syncretic 
planning of all operations. As she reported, a survey of plant managers 
conducted by the Honeywell Corporation found that "almost without 
exception, the "technology ideal" reported by plant managers was having one 
screen in their office from which they could operate the entire plant" (p. 283). 
In another cited study, Robert Howard finds that information systems "are 
indeed being used to reproduce the logic of scientific management—top down 
control, centralization of knowledge, de-skilling—more comprehensively than 
ever before. (Howard, 1985 p. 207) 
A skilled warrior must be fast (efficient) and adaptable (robust). It is 
easy to see how technologies can be utilized to increase speed and efficiency in 
data handling—but it is less clear whether this increase in data availability 
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translates into a smarter warrior. A danger of automation is that the warrior will 
become an automaton (see Figure 5). Thus, the system will be fast, but brittle. 
The increased efficiency will be at the expense of robustness. This is the 
fundamental design challenge—to harness the efficiency that information 
technologies offer without sacrificing the adaptability that the experienced 
human can contribute. The objective is to integrate the humans and technologies 
into a system that functions more efficiently and reliably than either would 
function alone. The technology should complement and amplify the human's 
natural capacities for expertise. 
One of the most exciting aspects of the relation between CSE and IW are 
the many analogs between the problem space of the IW analyst and of the CSE 
designer. Both the IW and the CSE communities are faced with "messy" or "ill- 
defined" problems. To illustrate that, we have paraphrased the characterization 
of war used to open this section in terms of design: 
Design is a complex and chaotic human endeavor. Human frailty and 
irrationality shape design's nature. Uncertainty and unpredictability—what 
many call the "fog" of design—combine with economic risks, political 
pressures, and human frailty to produce "friction," a phenomenon that makes 
apparently simple problems unexpectedly, and sometimes insurmountably, 
difficult. Uncertainty, unpredictability, and unreliability are always present, 
but sound doctrine, leadership, organization, core personal values, 
technologies, and training can lessen their effects. 
In some respects, IW is not about a type of war that will be fought in the 
future against a to-be-named enemy. IW is a battle that is raging at this instant. 
It is a war between humans and technology. It is a struggle to see whose "will" 
will dominate. Will advances in information technology be instruments for 
furthering human intentions, or will humans be overwhelmed by the complexity 
and become hostages to those technologies? In this respect, CSE is an offensive 
(proactive) strategy for fighting this war. As Section II illustrates, this strategy is 
a natural evolution that stems from struggles with earlier technologies. Section 
IQ presents a general framework for building a Common Battlespace Picture for 
planning this war. Section IV begins to flesh out this Common Battlespace 
Picture relative to a preliminary reconnaissance of the battlespace. Section V 
suggests some general tactics and some specific first steps for engaging the 
enemy. 
The goal is to impose our will on complex technologies. We would like 
to develop a unified approach that is simple, economical, and has clearly defined 
objectives. We would like to be proactive in attacking this battlespace—we want 
to dictate the pace of the engagement and we want to mass our resources where 
they will have the greatest positive effect with the minimum risks. In many 
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respects, technology is the barbarian at our gate and CSE represents our best 
strategy for preparing for victory by design. Victory over our information 
technologies may be the most effective path to peace in our world. 
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. 
George Washington 
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